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Opposition to the proposed Greek bailout deal has generally focused on the role of Germany, but
how do other Eurozone states view the debt crisis? Daniel Kral notes that while there is a tendency
to present the crisis as a stand-oﬀ between the Eurozone’s ‘North’ and ‘South’, the situation is far
more complex in practice. He writes that the ﬁve post-communist countries in the Eurozone –
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia – have been among the strictest in their line taken
on Greece, largely due to the perception that they are being asked to subsidise a country with
higher living standards than their own.
The Greek debt crisis is often framed in terms of a conﬂict between the Eurozone North, insistent on strict rules and
painful reforms, versus Greece, suﬀering from a debt overhang and externally imposed self-defeating austerity.
There is, however, another dimension to this conﬂict, typiﬁed by the ﬁve post-communist countries – Slovenia,
Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – that joined the euro between 2007 and 2015. As some have noticed,
these ﬁve countries are, in fact, among the most hawkish from the creditor states. Their uncompromising approach
vis-a-vis Greece reﬂects their own experience with the EU and Eurozone entry, economic realities and basic political
arithmetic.
To begin with, since their EU accession process,
which culminated in the great Eastern Enlargement of
2004, the Eastern European countries have been
granted no concessions by the old member states.
The accession negotiations were, in fact, not really
negotiations at all. The no less than 80,000 pages
long acquis communautaire was presented by the EU
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. For example, unlike
countries in earlier waves of enlargement, such as
the United Kingdom and Denmark, all Eastern
European states are obliged to join the Eurozone,
once complying with the Maastricht criteria. The
implications of this approach – where national
parliaments have been reduced to rubber-stamping
EU-dictated laws – for the still young and fragile
Eastern democracies have been widely debated.
Similarly, the entry into the Eurozone of the ﬁve East
European countries was preceded by strict
compliance with all of the Maastricht criteria. For
instance, due to the appreciation of Slovakia’s exchange rate above the permitted threshold, the country adopted the
euro in 2009 with a two year delay compared to their original plans. In a more humiliating manner, Lithuania was
denied Eurozone entry in 2007 for breaching the inﬂation target by 0.1 per cent. This is in stark contrast to the
experience of many of the Southern European states, which have been admitted to the Eurozone despite their
dubious ﬁscal credentials and prospects for economic survival in a currency union with Germany. For the East
European countries, no EU rule has ever been tweaked or overlooked in their favour. For them, adherence to
common rules, however strict, is all they have known.
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Second, appeals to solidarity with the struggling Southern counterparts run against a basic fact – that the EU’s
South is still, according to many indicators, richer than the East. Despite its ﬁve-year long recession, wages in
Greece continue to be higher than in the Eastern ﬁve, although all are broadly similar in terms of GDP per capita,
adjusted for the price level of their economies. While in 2014, Greek GDP per capita in PPS stood at 72 per cent of
the EU average, while the average ﬁgure was 74 per cent for the ﬁve East European countries, ranging from 64 per
cent in Latvia to 83 per cent in Slovenia. On the other hand, while the average gross wage in Greece in 2014 was
€1680, it was only €642 in Lithuania.
The same goes for welfare expenditures. In the year 2007, prior to the crisis, total Greek expenditure on social
protection amounted to almost 25 per cent of GDP, while it averaged 12.6 per cent of GDP for the three Baltic states
– that is half of the Greek level. By 2012, the ﬁgure for Greece increased to over 31 per cent of GDP, while – at 15.3
per cent of GDP – it still remains less than half of the Greek level in the three Baltic states. To illustrate this point, in
2014 the average pension in Lithuania and Latvia was €237 and €266 respectively, compared to €833 for Greece –
almost four times higher. The diﬀerence between the economic realities and ﬁscal arrangements in Greece and its
Eastern creditors can hardly be more striking.
As Laszlo Bruzst has observed, there is a stark contrast between the Eastern European economies – with
production proﬁles of the core, but consumption levels of the periphery – and Greece, which has consumption levels
of the core but production capacities of the periphery. It is unsurprising that the Easterners are reluctant to subsidise
in any way what they perceive as inﬂated and unsustainable living standards of the better-oﬀ Greeks.
Finally, East European governments have themselves enacted painful ﬁscal adjustment programmes in the wake of
the credit crunch. The Baltic governments radically cut public sector employment and wages, and basic public
services, hiked regressive taxes, such as VAT, while squeezing the wages of those on lowest incomes. According to
oﬃcial statistics, roughly 10 per cent of Latvians and 8 per cent of Lithuanians emigrated between 2008 and 2014,
often as a mere ‘survival strategy‘. No Baltic government can be perceived as being lax on the Greeks, when
domestic electorates have been served such bitter austerity pills.
In Slovakia, the government of Iveta Radičová fell in autumn 2011, when a junior coalition partner – the
economically libertarian Freedom and Solidarity party (SaS) – abstained from the vote on the ESM, the Eurozone’s
permanent bailout mechanism, despite it being joined with a motion of conﬁdence. Although the SaS barely made it
into parliament in the ensuing snap elections, since then the party has largely transformed itself into a single issue
movement, campaigning against further bailouts. As the message strongly resonates with the electorate, the Slovak
Finance Minister, Peter Kažimír, publicly adopted a very harsh – even controversial – stance against the Greek
government, not least on social media. As the likelihood of transfers to the South increases, mainstream parties may
become radicalised, as they ﬁnd themselves squeezed by populists advocating simple yet radical solutions to the
Eurozone’s complex woes.
It is not hard to see why reductionist accounts – typically coming from the other side of the Atlantic – that call on
Germany to forgive Greek debt paint a very misleading picture. The Eurozone is a much more diverse family. In an
interview for the Slovak business daily in January 2015, former Greek ﬁnance minister Yanis Varoufakis claimed it is
scandalous that Slovaks had to lend money to the Greek state. However, now that the damage is done, a viable
solution for Greece and the Eurozone is sorely needed. For it to be successful, it can hardly be built on an arbitrary
application of common rules, and ﬁnancial transfers from the poorer to the richer. The threat of a political revolt
among the disgruntled is too large to ignore.
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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